ABSTRACT
Social protest has long concerned rhetoric and argument scholars, whether they have endeavored to expand the realm of rhetoric (most recently, see Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011) or
think through the relationship between bodies and argument (see DeLuca, 1999). Even with this expansion of the domain of embodied argument, it nevertheless remains diffi cult to identify the signifi cance of what can only be described as the ineffable qualities of social protest. What role, if any, does speech that does not conform to conventional standards of argument analysis serve? Speech that is called angry and thus perceived to be irrational? Social protest that is unaccompanied by so-called demands (as when Occupy Wall Street was dismissed by the Left and Right alike)? Or social protest that popularly demands the removal of a democratically elected leader and which is elated when what many call a military coup – a word reserved for the forcible overthrow of an elected leader – is the result?
