ABSTRACT
A stark contrast exists between the popular image of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as a uniquely powerful international organisation (IO) and its actual capacity to monitor national policies and to enforce compliance with WTO rules among its member states. Rather than overseeing policy implementation itself like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, the WTO relies much more heavily than other high-profile IOs on a legalist method of surveillance. This article suggests that the notion of a ‘member-driven legalism’ is central to how the WTO ‘sees’ the world. In particular, the WTO’s processes reflect a strong institutional belief that neo-liberal policies can be implemented by a consensus- and member-driven legalistic WTO system. To illustrate the importance of understanding how the ways in which the WTO ‘sees’ the world of trade both enable and constrain its influence over trade relations, the article examines how the WTO constructs and classifies the world economy into enforceable trade issues, despite political impasse in the Doha Round. Examining the cases of trade in biofuels and trade in electronic ‘cultural products’, the article puts forward the argument that the WTO exercises cognitive authority in the world economy via the organisation’s distinctive classification and framing activities.
