ABSTRACT
This article analyses the conflict-fuelling effects of counterinsurgency on civil war in Peru (1980–1995) and Syria (2011–2012). Despite different escalation onsets, in both cases the state's response to the increasingly armed opposition intensified and protracted the conflict. The comparative analysis reveals five interdependent factors that were particularly influential in that regard: the state's denial of demands by certain segments of society; indiscriminate police and military repression; the impunity of state forces; and the expansion of non-state armed groups driven by radical agendas. The research has implications that connect research on terrorism with peace and conflict studies: first, the more the opposition's demands were responded to by disproportionate repression, the more likely became the option of armed insurgency. Second, due to the state's superior military resources, the insurgent groups increasingly applied terrorist operations. Third, at least in the case of Peru, the terrorist tactics put the state on the edge of defeat. However, the adjustment of the counterinsurgency strategy to a more bottom-up approach eventually gained the state the upper hand. The article ends with controversial reflection on how far the recent violence intensification by Syrian insurgents justifies the end; that is, regime change.
