ABSTRACT
The basic accountability system of the European Commission has changed over the last decade. New structures and rules with a range of ex ante constraints and ex post incentives have combined to provide a system for more control and accountability in and over the Commission. This paper uses two concepts of accountability – a passive and an active one – to analyse the modernisation of accountability at the top of the European Commission. Drawing on documentary evidence of politics during the Prodi (1999–2004) and Barroso I years (2004–09) and on interviews held with senior Commission officials during the Barroso incumbency, it shows how strengthened accountability mechanisms and a shift in the dominant types of accountability have characterised the modernisation of the Commission’s executive accountability system. In addition to legal and professional accountability systems, an elaborate mixture of accountability mechanisms was created that stressed political and bureaucratic mechanisms and that have created new expectations of accountability on the part of commissioners and their senior officials.
