ABSTRACT
This study analyzed the various phenomena present in the quantitative indicator evaluation of the performance evaluation of public institutions. The results of the empirical analysis provide the following answers to the two research questions: (1) How is the ratchet principle applied in target-setting? (2) What incentives do public institutions have in applying the ratchet principle in target-setting? I provide a variety of empirical findings such as target ratcheting phenomena, a negative association between ratcheting intensity and target achievability, serial correlation in target achievability, performance management, and effort reduction. Based on these empirical findings, I suggest that the qualitative evaluation should be incorporated into the quantitative analysis, and the qualitative levels should be considered not only in the target-setting stage but also in the final evaluation stage. In addition, I argue that if the quantitative indicators and evaluation method have been deemed to be rational, they should be used for a long period if possible.
