ABSTRACT
Suppose that there are two competing views, both of similar plausibility, but both of which entail that the other view is not only wrong but utterly wickedly so. It is not difficult to find real-life approximations. Consider the clearest case: Those who support abortion choice often tend to think that their opponents have the contemptible view that women should not have basic autonomy over their own bodies, while those who oppose abortion choice think that their opponents have the contemptible view that women should be allowed to kill their own children.
I argue, firstly, that some such disputes are sincere, and secondly, that there is no theoretical reason within moral epistemology why they should be obviously soluble. That is, there may be some such dilemmas in which a sincere agent has a considerable degree of agnosticism. The first implication of these theses is that it is extremely unlikely that all morally wicked views are obviously wrong or implausible—and especially unlikely that all morally wicked views are obviously implausible to all sincere agents. This has a further implication uncomfortable for many: that some morally abhorrent views are nevertheless plausible, or even probable.
There is thereby also an extremely important implication for academic discourse. While there are other practical and theoretical reasons for preserving academic freedom (in a broad sense), the recognition that the geometry of moral knowledge itself draws a fine—and sometimes evidentially/rationally indeterminate—line between the morally abhorrent and the morally obligatory should give us very strong reason to. For there is good reason to engage with sincere disputants, for their own sake, for the sake of ourselves (since they may change our mind and relieve us of our own abhorrent views), and for the pursuit of truth. If there is a fairly good chance we are wrong and that we ourselves have abhorrent views, that is extremely good reason to test our views against our opponents’. In short, a view’s being appalling is not good reason to think it is also extremely improbable. This warrants greater informal sympathy and a hearing for sincere agents expressing contemptible views; and moreover it recommends that such hearings extend to the academy.
