ABSTRACT

Campus speech policies give rise to the objection that universities are silencing points of view in order to spare some from being offended. Offense is a problematically ambiguous term: “I am offended” is an emotional report while “That is offensive” is a normative claim. The debate surrounding campus speech has not distinguished the two adequately, leading to the view that trigger-warnings protect students from having their feelings hurt. In this paper, I show that this is the wrong way to think about the offensive speech.

Joel Feinberg argues that, in terms of its effect on the audience, some offensive speech is akin to loud noises and foul odors. He defends an Offense Principle, according to which speech should be regulated when it creates a public nuisance. I explore how the Offense Principle applies to campus speech. I argue that it captures one important idea and leaves another out.

First, one reason why people want protection from emotional triggers is that, like being exposed to a blinding flash of light, this shuts down rather than engages one’s intellectual powers. When universities enact protective policies, this does not mean they are putting hurt feelings ahead of the search for truth. Rather, the goal of the warning is to enable students to engage critically with offensive ideas.

Second, when I say, “That’s offensive” I am engaging in a form of moral dialogue with my community. This is a speech act that invites dialectical engagement with the audience. In some cases, others will share my judgment while in others it will be challenged, and we will need to debate the matter further. Well-crafted campus speech policies with respect to offense foster exactly this kind of discussion.

The conclusion of this argument is that both senses of offense are important parts of the intellectual mission of universities. All students should be in a position to critically engage with difficult ideas on campus.