ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a detailed accounting of the development of economic models of deterrence as well as a brief discussion of the influence that these theories have had on subsequent empirical research. The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section lays out the neoclassical economic model of crime and its various extensions. The second section characterizes the empirical literature that has attempted to test deterrence theory as it has been presented in the neoclassical economic model. Using Becker’s (1968) work as a guide, the chapter briefly reviews the three large bodies of literature that have developed within both criminology and economics that seek to explore the margins along which offenders are potentially deterred. Finally, the third section considers how deterrence theory and its associated empirical tests are informative with respect to public decision-making. The chapter seeks to clearly define economic concepts and relate them to corresponding theoretical constructs in the criminology literature. While the chapter appeals to a mathematical development of theory, where the mathematics enhance insight, it omits lengthy derivations and instead focuses on the underlying logic of the models and the implications these models have for subsequent empirical work as well as policy and practice.
