ABSTRACT
In 1741 Major-General Wentworth was armed with descriptions of Cartagena and the road from Guantanamo Bay to Santiago de Cuba provided by South Sea factors, sailors and exprisoners of the Spaniards. Of all types of military and naval activity, combined operations have had a particular fascination for public and politicians in the English-speaking world. In the historiography of combined operations, both professional and technical factors have been advanced at one time or another as being fundamental causes of success or failure on different operations. Since 1945 historians have concentrated a little more upon the technical changes that took place in eighteenth-century amphibious warfare. The most misleading conclusions concern the command structure and direction of operations. Eighteenth-century governments are supposed to have lacked clarity of purpose and their administrations sufficient vigour for amphibious operations which required speed and secrecy. William Pitt's influence upon the direction of amphibious operations was much the same as that of any eighteenth-century secretary of state.
