ABSTRACT
While historical parallels are never direct, and contributing factors rarely the same, the French army of 1914 had faced a similar dilemma. French army doctrine during the previous forty years had vacillated between mass and dispersion. Defeated armies normally reform more quickly than victorious armies, and the French army was no exception. It was the first to assimilate and express in doctrine the tactical lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. London reported that "today the French Army maneuvers came to a spectacular end with furious bayonet charges, heavy artillery duels, and the usual impossible attack upon strongly-held positions." Deceived by Prussia and deluded by an overly optimistic assessment of his army by others, Napoleon III precipitated the Franco-Prussian War. The French were able to modify their tactical doctrine as World War I progressed; a nuclear war may not last long enough for the American army to do the same.
