ABSTRACT
General Josiah Harmar's campaign against the "Indian banditti" along the Maumee River in 1790 marks a watershed in the settlement of the Old Northwest and also in the evolution of America's military institutions. Smoldering hostilities and mutual provocations between Indians and whites in the West provided the background for Harmar's campaign. The dispersed and fragmentary nature of the primary sources has long prevented a comprehensive, scholarly exposition of the resulting "Battle of Kekionga," which proved to be the climax of Harmar's expedition. The causes of Harmar's defeat at Kekionga ran much deeper than John P. Wyllys's and James McMullan's failure to support one another in the climactic battle. Scholars have noted the poor quality of the militia rank and file ever since Harmar's court of inquiry. Richard H. Kohn argues that Harmar must share blame with Governor St. Clair for committing the prestige of the United States to a venture uncertain of purpose and constructed of half measures.
