ABSTRACT
This chapter presents three historical cases: the United States air strikes in Libya in 1986, the cruise missile attacks on Iraq in 1993, and the cruise missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998. Libya's contribution to the overall infrastructure of international terrorism was greater than Syria and Iran and possibly of any other country. The Persian Gulf War left unresolved a number of important differences between the United States and Iraq. Operating primarily out of the rural regions of Afghanistan and Sudan, Osama bin Laden provided funding, support, and training for groups willing to strike out against the United States. The chapter examines the military, political, and strategic outcomes from each of these incidents, asking in each case what the use of military force accomplished. Skeptics argue that military force does not deter terrorism and in fact only results in more violence, when the terrorist retaliates. A majority of Americans still supported military force as an appropriate response to terrorism.
