ABSTRACT
This chapter examines North Korean efforts to implement a deterrence policy in the post-Cold War world. It consists of several parts: a review of deterrence theory, particularly as it relates to an asymmetric relationship; North Korean threat perceptions; and North Korea's implementation of a deterrence policy. Nuclear weapons, allow a country to threaten devastating retaliatory strikes that drastically raise the costs for an adversary considering a challenge to the status quo. Scholars have identified several important refinements to the types of situations where states implement deterrence: immediate versus general deterrence; primary versus extended deterrence; and symmetrical versus asymmetrical deterrence. The chapter examines North Korea as the defender in an asymmetrical relationship where rationality may play a different role, especially as it affects the credibility of North Korea's deterrence policy. Utilizing Kaufman's criteria – capability, cost, and resolve – for a credible deterrence policy, it assesses various dimensions of North Korea's efforts to deter a possible US use of military force.
