ABSTRACT
Much Western misunderstanding of the 1964 coup stems from the incorrect assumption that the plot to remove Nikita Khrushchev was hatched and executed with great speed, in October 1964. One cannot but see a certain irony in the fact that Khrushchev's replacement was engineered not by some neo-Stalinist opposition, but by his own closest confidants and supporters. Evidently having learned the lessons of 1957, Khrushchev's opponents spent considerable time and energy enlisting supporters for their cause among the territorial party apparatus. Aleksei Adzhubei has acknowledged that virtually every social group in the country had a reason to be dissatisfied with Khrushchev's rule. Adzhubei reckons that the rules requiring minimum rates of turnover in party bodies and limiting the terms of officeholders were particularly damaging. Khrushchev's continuation in power was thus seen as a threat not only to the political fortunes of his fellow oligarchs, but to the very stability of the entire Soviet regime.
