ABSTRACT
The Valley campaign of 1864 began as an attempt by Confederates under Gen. Robert E. Lee to drive Gen. David Hunter from the Valley and protect the "breadbasket" of the Confederacy. The realization of Grant's plans against the Confederates hinged partially on the Federals's ability to obtain accurate strategic intelligence regarding troop transfers between Richmond and the Valley—something they lacked during Early's raid. An examination of Ulysses S. Grant's Bureau of Military Information and Sheridan's Valley scouts commanded by Maj. Henry K. Young and the information these groups collected provides a different perspective from which to view events. Despite reports to the contrary, the expectation of a Confederate drive to regain the Weldon, buttressed by Early's command, spread through Federal camps. Sheridan's desire to "press" the Valley Confederates was the result of nearly a month of constant moves and countermoves that drove Early from the lower Valley.
