ABSTRACT
This chapter attempts to assess the significance and justification of H. A. Prichard's criticisms and their effect on Green's account of moral obligation. Prichard's criticism centers on two fundamental and related concepts in Green, "society" and "common good". Prichard contends that when Green asserts that rights originate in a "society" this is only a confused way of saying that rights originate with the power of a government. Prichard contends that Green gives the term "common good" a nonsensical meaning, because according to his usage, individuals must be identical in order for the good to be common. The adequacy of Prichard's argument clearly depends upon establishing that for Green all actions are self-interested. Prichard has shown not only that Green's ethical theory is nonsensical, but that any ethical theory based on egoistic premises will fail to give an adequate account of moral and political obligation.
