ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at that Berlin, like others, seizes on T. H. Green too quickly here and that the problem lies rather with Green's confusion of the concept of liberty and a normative substantive theory of freedom. Green's view of positive freedom is portrayed by Berlin as laying the foundation for an oppressive society. Positive freedom is said to have been used too often to support a variety of despotisms. Hence, theories of positive freedom are inconsistent with liberalism. External positive freedom rests on the claim that absence of coercion is compatible with unfreedom since the uncoerced person is unable to exercise his capacities. For the liberal holder of the negative conception of freedom coercion alone is the legitimate obstacle to freedom. Negative liberty indicates the absence of the two constraints; positive freedom, their presence. Green's claim is that freedom so unconstrained is likely to lead to harming the interests of others, or loss of their freedom.
