ABSTRACT
T. H. Green's views on political obligation and disobedience to law are seldom discussed in the large literature on topics that have appeared in the last twenty years or so. It is not a simple matter to come to Green's discussion of law and disobedience on its own terms. His use of certain key terms is quite different from own, and this can easily mislead unwary. The usual modern approach to the problem of political obligation confines it to questions of obedience to law and state. The essential foundations of Green's analysis of the relations between the individual and law are set out in Prolegomena in the arguments concerning moral duty, moral progress, and 'perplexities of conscience'. Green is careful to stress that the conceptions of law and government on one hand, and of the moral person on other, are ideal in the sense that people cannot expect either to measure up completely in practice to what theory demands of it.
