ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author explains that scientific response counters the epistemological approaches in the name of scientific explanations of alleged experiences of God. He argues that, in principle at least, neuroscientific findings could make it quite unlikely that God-experiences were veridical. The author sets out the requirements for any successful scientific reduction of God-experiences. He looks at a leading current neuropsychological theory of mystical experiences, that of Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg. The author explains why it fails to generate reductionist conclusions. He relates to the scientific response as an argument against accepting a theistic interpretation of alleged God-experiences, rather than as an attempt to explain such experiences after discarding their theistic interpretation. The strength of the theory of deafferentiation lies in its ability to explain a variety of experiences. It explains both theistic and non-theistic experiences and meditative and non-meditative experiences.
