ABSTRACT
Traditionally, scholars of international relations (IR) have avoided labeling either conflict or collaboration as inherently “bad” or “good” and would thus be in agreement with this volume that such a binary characterization is overly simplistic as a way of describing international outcomes or foreign policy. However, IR theorists also tend in general to be wary of assessments such as “better” or “worse” in a normative sense. For mainstream IR “good” is peace and peace is stability, namely the absence of violent armed conflict and war. In this sense, outcomes that involve securing justice and fairness are ranked lower in value. This cautiousness can largely be attributed to the recognition by scholars in the field that international relations is fundamentally ironic: good intentions do not always lead to good outcomes. This is the foundation of the “security dilemma,” in which foreign policy-makers’ actions intended to increase their own state’s security are often perceived as potentially threatening to others, leading to conflict spirals from which states find it difficult to escape. War is extremely costly, and consequently states have every incentive to avoid it. Yet when push comes to shove, the inherent mistrust and fear characterizing the nature of the international system often inhibit cooperative efforts.
