ABSTRACT
The diffusion of food safety regulation provides an opportunity for a fresh look at the costs and benefits of decentralized governance and reliance on third party delivery. Regulatory activity related to food safety—specifically, food safety inspections—has diffused rapidly from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to states via contracts. Regulation of this type has traditionally been conducted by the federal government, but dependence on state contracts grew substantially by 2004. However, a widely publicized outbreak of salmonella originating in a Georgia peanut processing plant prompted Congress to mandate that the Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) undertake a systematic review of FDA’s contractual relationships with states. The salmonella outbreak and the consequent HHSOIG report led to new federal legislation that intensified inspection requirements, yet also established a policy of increased reliance on state contracts to achieve that goal. People can and do die quickly and in large numbers when the policy fails. Emerging patterns in the data suggest substantial variations in the capacity of states to carry out contractual duties, and in the political and economic incentives related to the states’ structural inspection systems, specifically with regard to the orientations (public health versus agriculture) of state organizations conducting inspections.
