ABSTRACT
The Wittgensteinian ideas that this chapter explores come from the sections currently called the Rule-Following sections in the Philosophical Investigations, that is sections 138 to 242. The dominant attitude to Wittgenstein at the time we were students was that the later Wittgenstein had refuted a long-standing approach to meaning, the approach which equated understanding language with the presence of suitably caused images in those who understand. When people propose interpretations of the rule-following arguments, their proposals are shaped by the general reading of Wittgenstein they accept. It may be that the term "negative" has itself a rather negative tone, and another, perhaps more positive, way of expressing the same point is to say that Wittgenstein is engaged in demythologising. The fact that the extent of so-called "philosophy" has no really discernible boundaries means we have no idea what Wittgenstein thinks it is legitimate to challenge and what it is not legitimate to challenge.
