ABSTRACT
This chapter affirms two perspectives on evolutionary accounts of morality that are often presented as strongly oppositional. The first is that the fundamental behaviors, affective dispositions, cognitive capacities, and even many concepts are employed by or are unique to human morality, are organismic phenotypes that have an evolutionary origin. The second is that crucial scientific questions remain to be solved. One of the most recent and fruitful areas of theoretical and experimental progress has applied the logic of evolutionary game theory to the domain of social behaviors involving cooperation, defection, and equitable distribution of risks and resources. Game theory illuminates the kinds of moral standards that make evolutionary sense. Altruism involves a behavior that seems to be highly if not quintessentially moral, but violates standards of Darwinian rationality. A representative synopsis of the altruism issue in evolutionary theory affirms: "The problem of altruism, both biological and psychological, is at the center of grounding a theory of morality within biology".
