ABSTRACT
Poland was much bigger than the previous beneficiaries of the Soviet Union's "fraternal help;" and the popular mood strongly anti-Russian. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, in 1968 there was a high probability of armed resistance to an invasion. It would take a considerable military force to subdue and garrison—for how long?— the country of thirty-five million people. The much-preferred solution had to be an internal subjugation of the revolution. But what of the general strike threatened by Solidarity if ever such emergency measures were to be used? What of the Polish army, which, as had confidently been predicted, would turn against its superiors if they tried to use it against their countrymen? The simultaneous arrest of thousands of activists left Solidarity leaderless. One can picture the shock and fury of Polish friends. They all agreed that if and when Polish Communism collapsed, something very unpleasant awaited the main architect of the coup.
