ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the concept of equality can be explicated in terms of generalization, and that to do so shows that as normative concepts both equality and generalization are of derivative significance. It concerns the importance of utilitarian considerations in morals. The chapter also argues that a substantive doctrine of equality is concealed by the ostensibly formal or neutral character of Generalization or Universalizability Principle (GP). It will facilitate the analysis to use a real controversy concerning equality as a source of examples and illustrations. The recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning apportionment in state legislatures, the "one-man, one-vote" decisions, are well suited to this purpose. The force of the foregoing analysis is primarily negative. It seeks to demonstrate that equality or equal treatment is a derivative criterion inadequate for determining Tightness or wrongness. Attempts to elevate it to the status of a sufficient standard involve logical errors that could readily lead to unsatisfactory decisions.
