ABSTRACT

The phenomenal growth of Islamic finance in the last few decades has been accompanied by a host of interesting questions and challenges. One of the critical challenges is how Islamic financial institutions can be motivated to participate in the 'equity-like' profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contracts. It is observed that Islamic banks are reluctant to participate in the pure PLS scheme which is manifested by the rising concentration of investment on murabaha or mark-up financing. This phenomenon has been the hotbed of academic criticism on the contemporary practice of Islamic banking. This book explains the 'murabaha syndrome' in light of the incentive provided by the current institutional framework and what are the changes required in the governance structure to mend this anomaly.

chapter |8 pages

Introduction

part I|49 pages

Dilemmas and challenges on the prohibition of riba and gharar

part II|86 pages

Issues in Islamic equity finance and microfinance

chapter 4|16 pages

Altruism and reciprocity in Islamic equity fund

New Institutional and philosophical speculations

chapter 5|18 pages

Anatomy of Islamic venture capital

Typology of Bahraini/Indonesian Islamic venture capital

chapter 8|18 pages

An impact assessment of Islamic Saving–Loan and Financing Cooperatives in Indonesia

Preliminary findings from the artificial neural networks technique

part III|49 pages

Dilemmas and challenges in governance structure