ABSTRACT
If Aristotle has provided the inspiration for new articulations of naturalism, his importance in this regard was first fully registered within the post-Kantian context by Hegel. Hegel thus freely helps himself to what would seem to be the bald empirical givens of human anthropology, physiology, pneumatology, and psychology--race, age, sleep, the five senses, madness, memory, and so forth--even as he continually rejects the interpretation that those givens are heteronomous with respect to our rational capacities. He makes sure to distinguish his description of spiritual capacities from the view that we have anything like fixed and discrete mental faculties or parts. This chapter briefly indicates the tenor of his objections, before describing how his approach aims to remedy the faults of that position. Both aspects of Hegel's strategy are well summarized by a passage near the beginning of the Philosophy of Spirit in the Encyclopedia.
