ABSTRACT
A common view of early twentieth-century philosophy correctly distinguishes three movements or tendencies, phenomenology, pragmatism and the beginnings of analytic philosophy, and claims that early phenomenology and pragmatism are two radically opposed philosophical positions. Edmund Husserl criticizes his fellow phenomenologists for neglecting the philosophy of the scientific world-picture and thus the relations between the latter and the natural world-picture and attempts to remedy these lacks. The objects of natural perception are milieu things, things belonging to an environment, and milieu processes, which are “existentially relative, property-relative and relative as far as their effects are concerned to organisms.” Pragmatism, Max Scheler argues, in spite of his enthusiastic endorsement of many pragmatist ideas, is wrong about meaning, logic, truth, knowledge, and philosophy. He argues at length that science represents in many respects an almost total break with the natural worldview but that mechanical physics and associationist psychology do indeed draw on some features of the natural worldview.
