ABSTRACT
Debates over the wisest course for American grand strategy increasingly center on the value of political and military commitments for influencing the behavior of other states. Primacy’s advocates contend that U.S. security commitments dampen global security competition by providing Washington with a means to restrain its partners from provocative behaviors that can lead to intense security dilemmas and conflict spirals. In particular, U.S. commitments are often said to restrain allies from seeking nuclear weapons and thus to prevent reactive proliferation spirals. This chapter evaluates the idea that primacy prevents nuclear proliferation. The chapter first evaluates that argument on the basis of existing literature. It then examines eight capsule cases where the U.S. sought to prevent proliferation in an allied or client state. The cases include four “successes” (West Germany, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan) and four “failures” (France, Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan). Each case considers the causes and extent of the client’s nuclear statecraft; the character of American non-proliferation efforts; and the degree to which U.S. commitments provided leverage. The chapter concludes that, while American strategic commitments have enjoyed some modest successes in restricting nuclear proliferation, they have just as often encouraged proliferation among friendly states, and are accompanied by serious strategic costs not accounted for by most advocates of primacy.
