ABSTRACT
This chapter suggests that Gottlob Frege and Wilfrid Sellars are both right both in regard to the thesis on which they are in agreement, that the inferential articulation of concepts is constitutive of our capacity for knowledge, and in regard to the thesis regarding the objectivity of concepts, on which they are in complete disagreement. They are both right about the first thesis because the rationality of inquiry lies in the capacity for self-correction that is made possible by, and only by, the inferential articulation of concepts. And they are both right regarding the second thesis, despite their disagreement, because the concepts Sellars is concerned with are utterly different from those Frege is concerned with. Sellars is right: natural language knows no Fregean concepts. Concepts are rather what Frege teaches people are the senses expressed by words; they are what Sellars thinks of as conceptual meanings.
