ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on economics imperialism and a controversy over the normative basis for claiming that economics imperialism is sometimes an undesirable form of cross-disciplinary interaction. It discusses a conception of epistemic injustice in order to analyze a distinctively epistemic kind of unfairness that may be involved in economics imperialism. The chapter also discusses Uskali Maki's attempt to define the conditions under which economics imperialism is a legitimate form of cross-disciplinary interaction. It introduces Steve Clarke and Adrian Walsh's attempt to apply political theory to philosophy of science in order to articulate and defend the normative basis for demarcating between acceptable and unacceptable instances of economics imperialism. It also argues that while Clarke and Walsh are right to suggest that there is a moral-political component in the criticism of economics imperialism, their analysis needs to be supplemented by an account of epistemic injustice. The chapter aims to articulate and defend the principle of a fair distribution of credibility.
