ABSTRACT
Thought experiments have played an important role in scientific progress throughout the history of science, and are employed to serve various purposes. This chapter considers the epistemic status and function of thought experiments. It analyses the Empiricist Thesis. Most philosophers who attack the Epistemic Thesis of the argument view attempt to show that, due to their specific pictorial and narrative form, thought experiments are epistemically superior to their corresponding non-thought-experimental arguments. James Robert Brown is one of the most prominent and persistent critics of Norton's argument view. Brown contends that not all thought experiments can be seen as mere picturesque arguments. According to Brown, there are some thought experiments, the so-called "Platonic thought experiments", that provide a priori knowledge by a non-experiential perception of abstract entities. For Brown, a Platonic thought experiment allows "to see with the mind's eye", that is, to grasp abstract entities in an intuitive and non-inferential way.
