ABSTRACT
Nietzsche's writings on truth are among the most elusive and difficult ones in his corpus. One indication of their obscurity is that on an initial reading he appears either blatantly inconsistent in his use of the words 'true' and 'truth', or subject to inexplicable vacillations on the value of truth. The prima facie case for the attractive approach is strengthened by the fascination Nietzsche's commentators have had for his views on truth and the consequent proliferation of interpretations of those views. Nietzsche's attacks on logic are rarely attacks on logical laws or rules of inference; more often he attacks the metaphysical assumption that there are entities in the world to which the formulae of logic apply. Nietzsche's perspectivism about truth is the target of a frequently encountered argument that claims that perspectivism is either self-referentially inconsistent or self-referentially paradoxical, or both. The paradox of perspectivism has been an irritant for Nietzsche's interpreters and has resulted in some strange defenses.
