ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the conceptual relation between autonomy and emotional vulnerability. Emotional vulnerability is a constitutive feature of human agency. Some emotions pertain to humans insofar as they are social animals and thus their dynamics are particularly revelatory of the social nature of embodied agents such as we are. Understood as an ontological feature of embodied agents, emotional vulnerability is generally taken to identify an aspect of passivity that is at odds with autonomy. Emotions often undermine rational control. Since rational control is importantly connected to autonomy, emotions are likely to threaten our status as autonomous and rational agents. Furthermore, our agency is often driven by emotional tendencies that are insensitive to judgment or recalcitrant, resisting deliberation and reform. Thus, emotions often operate as external forces that undermine our authority on action. Social emotions seem especially threatening in this regard, insofar as they make us dependent on one another. Love makes us rely on the affection and commitment of our beloved; shame subjects us to moral judgment and social pressure. In short, the relation between autonomy and emotional vulnerability seems to be conflictual. The essay argues that attention to the varieties of emotional vulnerability shows that the primary function of emotions is to contribute to agential autonomy. The case rests on the examination of social emotions, such as love and shame.
