ABSTRACT
Human nature forms a logical "bridge" concept between the metaphysical and the socio-political accounts which Spinoza offers, and so it is natural that contemporary thinkers would look to this concept as a means of attacking a number of puzzles and seemingly contradictory affirmations in the text of Spinoza. One might follow Bennett's lead in claiming that the move from individual conational activity to genuine interpersonal relationships is not valid within the context of Spinoza's method in any case. Spinoza held mankind or humanity as a whole to be a complex individual whose parts are individual human beings. Spinoza is, in Alexandre Matheron's view, unable to distinguish human beings from rational non-humans either below (higher animals) or above (extra-terrestrials). This chapter suggests that deferral does not yield cirumvention as a byproduct, and that the question of essence and nature from a perspective wider than that of human nature is one well worth raising.
