ABSTRACT
The 1997 Singapore general election gave the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) a spectacular victory. It won 81 of the 83 seats and increased its share of the popular vote, reversing the electoral trend of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many analysts had expected the PAP to lose up to ten seats. The strong showing of the PAP was due to several factors, including: the advantage of the incumbent's unbroken rule since independence, its record of economic management, the short campaign period, the media's unashamed support of the PAP, changes in electoral boundaries which favoured the incumbent, and the fragmentation of the opposition parties. The key PAP strategies were: the targeting of a relatively unknown figure (Tang Liang Hong) rather than the well-known (Chiam See Tong, Chee Soon Juan, and J. B. Jeyaretnam), and a promise to upgrade quickly Housing and Development Board (HDB) estates in constituencies represented by the ruling party. The paper concludes that the prospects for the opposition in Singapore are bleak. The election result also suggests that contrary to conventional political development theory, rapid economic growth and the rise of the middle class need not lead to stronger opposition and a more democratic political system.
