ABSTRACT
The egalitarianism has as its ideal a condition of equal wellbeing for all persons at the highest possible level of well-being, i.e. maximum equal well-being. This chapter differentiates the egalitarianism with which it contrasts in a natural way. It begins the task of clarification by examining different theories of the good or of well-being. The chapter takes up the question of the coordination of the ideal of equal well-being with the distribution of certain particular goods. It discusses the relation for an egalitarian between equality and other moral values. The chapter discusses some problems raised by special needs, physically deprived individuals and scarcity. It reveals the structure of a systematic and plausible egalitarian theory. A more plausible interpretation of the claim that egalitarianism is committed to absolute equality is the view that it can admit no distributive values other than equality, and allow no exceptions to this value.
