ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author defends Harry Frankfurt’s compatibilist-friendly attack on the demand for alternative possibilities as a condition of moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s attack is meant to provide succor to the compatibilist in that, if successful, it would defuse one important argument for incompatibilism. The theoretical advantage the limited blockage strategy offers over other recent Frankfurt example strategies is that limited blockage cases openly grant libertarian freedom involving alternative possibilities. The examples, therefore, clearly do not require any special considerations that might tacitly import a deterministic relation between agent and action. Indeed, they allow an agent in a Frankfurt example oodles and oodles of alternatives. Frankfurt defenders have been too generous with their adversaries is in the basis for granting an alternative the status of robustness. It explains of the two conditions required for a robust alternative: the alternative must be morally significant, and it must be within the scope of the agent’s control.
