ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author wishes to advance the debate over the strength of Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) in two ways. First, the author considers some new attempts to provide examples of IRR-situations and contend that they do not succeed either. Second, and more important, granting Frankfurt’s assumption that IRR-situations are possible, the author provides a comprehensive defense of PAP for one sense of ‘morally responsible,’ that of moral blameworthiness. There is a widely held view among moral philosophers that Frankfurt’s attack on PAP constitutes a definitive refutation of the traditional libertarian conception of freedom and moral responsibility. The author tries to advance the debate over the plausibility of PAP further by considering and rejecting more sophisticated counterexamples to PAP, and by casting doubt upon the moral assumptions underlying Frankfurt’s attack. Furthermore, the author tries to articulate the basic intuition underlying PAP.
