ABSTRACT
This chapter explicates Quentin Meillassoux's understanding of the "paradox of correlationism" by considering his manner of responding to two standard correlationist objections to his account. It highlights Meillassoux's brand of naturalism and its deployment in formulating his counter objections. The chapter explains how Wilfrid Sellars' own peculiar naturalism alters both sides of the discussion and thereby charts a different way forward than the one opted for by Meillassoux. It focuses on the different ways that Sellars and Meillassoux pursue their respective speculations about the nature of reality as it is in itself. Meillassoux is correct to draw a distinction between the space and time that characterize the givenness of the correlational experiences and the supposed space and time in which extra-correlational objects and events would occur in and through. The chapter focuses on how Meillassoux conceives of a particular type of correlationism—strong correlationism—which one believe can be inverted into his own speculative position based on the necessity of contingency.
