'Toward a "Force–in–Being": The Logic, Structure, and Utility of India's Emerging Nuelear Posture', in Surnit Ganguly (ed.), India as an Emerging Power, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, pp. 61–108

After a hiatus of almost 24 years, India startled the world by resuming nuclear testing at a time when the international community solemnly expressed a desire through the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to refrain from the field-testing of nuclear explosives. On 11 May 1998, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, tersely announced that New Delhi had conducted three nuclear tests, one of which invalved the detonation of a thermonuclear device. As a stunned global community struggled to respond to this development, India announced two days later that it had conducted two more detonations. In the aftermath of these tests, lndia declared itself to be a 'nuclear weapon state' 1 and formally announced its intention to develop a 'minimum credible (nuclear) deterrent' .2