ABSTRACT
The question of the reception of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the philosophy of religion resolves itself into a number of separate but related questions. First, there is the question how far Wittgenstein's contribution to the philosophy of religion has been recognized and assimilated. Second, scholars might ask how far Wittgenstein's general philosophical method has been put to work in the area of the philosophy of religion. As a glance at mainstream works in the philosophy of religion indicates, this is largely what happens; while some are unhappily seduced into Wittgensteinian irrelevance, the great majority are clear-sighted enough to stick to the traditional agenda. The traditionals simply fail at this point to appreciate the depth of the Wittgensteinian challenge. The faith of the Wittgensteinian believer can appear to be, in the worst sense, a game played with language, a game which the Wittgensteinian insists on playing without any concern for what is really out there, independently of what language-games scholars play.
