ABSTRACT
In his discussion of the reception of Ludwig Wittgenstein within the philosophy of religion, Gareth Moore notes what he takes to be an evident truth, namely, that Wittgenstein's impact in the philosophy of religion has been minimal. Part of what lies behind this conclusion is Moore's argument concerning the influence of Wittgenstein's own religious sensibilities on that part of his philosophical work that seems to bear most directly on issues in the philosophy of religion. In arguing that the differences between the 'Wittgensteinians' and the 'traditionals' are not just philosophical but religious differences, Moore's strategy is to consider some of the work of D. Z. Phillips as representative of the 'Wittgensteinian' school and then to turn to Wittgenstein himself. Moore identifies Phillips as a philosopher who has 'effectively criticized philosophers of the traditional school, often building on insights from Wittgenstein's writings in the field of religion as well as more general texts such as On Certainty'.
