ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses some of the gulfs that may lie between: the gulfs about which Ludwig Wittgenstein speaks in the first lecture, and the gulf between Wittgenstein himself and Smythies, a gulf that appears to open up between them in the third lecture. The lectures that scholars know under the title 'Lectures on Religious Belief' were part of a series of lectures on belief; and belief was itself a topic of great importance for Wittgenstein, early and late. A not altogether dissimilar view is taken by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, even though he did not think that what is believed or judged or entertained was grammatically the sort of thing that Frege took it to be. Wittgenstein rejected, in the Tractatus, the idea that scholars can make sense of a conception of languages with a different range of intelligibility from the language that scholars ourselves speak.
