ABSTRACT
In a series of publications I have tried to make the case for a different way of thinking about rational choice, one that applies to certain intrapersonal and interpersonal choice situations.1 The intrapersonal problems I have in mind are those in which one must make a series of choices over time, under conditions in which one expects that one’s preference ordering over various options will change. On the usual account, if one decides on the basis of present preferences to embark upon a plan, one has to anticipate that, at some subsequent point in time, one may no longer prefer to continue to execute the plan, and this not because of new information, but simply because from the perspective of the later point in time, one’s evaluation of the options one then confronts is different than it now is, at the earlier point in time. In such a situation, then, one faces the proverbial problem of “weakness of will”, associated, for example, with finding oneself tempted to depart from dietary plans, exercise plans and the like.2 The interpersonal problems I have in mind are those in which distinct agents interact with one another, either simultaneously or over time, under circumstances in which
each would stand to benefit from all (or most) adhering to a rule.3 The problem is that the benefits one expects to derive from the arrangement typically will be realized by the participatory actions of others. Correspondingly, one’s own commitment to the rule is cost. Given, then, that others will in fact do their part, one can often do better yet by acting in a non-participatory manner. In short, one confronts here the familiar free-rider problem.
