ABSTRACT
Background More than ten years after the momentous changes in the Czech Republic, the relevance of political parties for the new political system can be little doubted. Overall, if one examines the functioning of democracy in the country, and the way the system generates substantive outcomes, the political party – in all relevant aspects – is a crucial variable to look at. Indeed, it is far from an exaggeration to say that Czech parties have gradually been able to impose a party government (cf. Katz 1986) order on society (see Kopecký 2005). The political system consequently allows relatively little exercise of independent authority beyond the party reach. Recruitment to both elective and appointive public office is the most obvious sign of strong party control. With respect to the former, parties have virtually no challengers in the selection of political personnel, because access to legislative and (thus) governmental positions is a matter of exclusive partisan considerations (Kopecký 2001). Independent candidates stand no chance in parliamentary elections. This situation largely stems from the electoral law: only registered parties can present lists of candidates, and only parties are in the position to pay the financial deposit required to register for (national) elections. But it is also a function of increased organizational capacity of parties, which are now in possession of enough cadres to avoid the early 1990s practice of enriching (and legitimising) their lists with non-party candidates nominated by social groups, or with high profile personalities from various cultural sectors of society. Indeed, while much hope was put by the champions of ‘independent personalities’ into the election to the upper chamber of the parliament (the Senate) – the election conducted in single-member constituencies – even these elections have so far turned out to be predominantly party races. The electoral system to the lower chamber of the parliament (the Chamber of Deputies) is a PR list system. For all the elections conducted between 1990 and 1998, the voters had to choose in eight multi-member districts between party lists of candidates, but were able to modify the order of the listed candidates through
preferential voting. The Droop quota was used in districts for the first-tier distribution of seats (redistribution at a national level was first done using the Droop quota, and then the d’Hondt formula for the remaining seats). In 1992, the legal threshold nationally was set at 5 per cent for individual parties, and at 7 per cent, 9 per cent, and 11 per cent for coalitions of two, three, or more parties respectively. The reform of the electoral system further increased these thresholds in 2001: they have now been set nationally at 5 per cent for an individual party, and 10 per cent, 15 per cent, and 20 per cent for coalitions of two, three, or more parties respectively. Moreover, the number of districts was increased from eight to 14, and a modified d’Hondt formula was introduced to distribute the seats in districts. All these changes had two underlying reasons: to limit the competition by increasing the barrier for entry to parliament, and to empower larger political parties by increasing the disproportionality of electoral results (see Crawford 2001, Williams 2002, Kopecký 2004a). The preferential voting, which survived the electoral reform, allows citizens to alter the proposed lists of candidates. This means that deputies might benefit from building up a personal reputation in their constituencies, and thus counter eventual attempts of the party to thwart their re-nomination. Generally speaking, the use of preferential votes has also increased since its introduction in the 1990 electoral laws. Yet, the number of elected deputies who actually jumped up the list has not increased at all, because preferences seem to be allocated in such a way that they fail to favour particular candidates. A partial and very important explanation is that a slight tinkering with the electoral rules has resulted in an increased threshold needed for a candidate to move up on the proposed list, thus insulating parties from potential difficulties in controlling nominations and recruitment to parliament. The selection of ministers conveys a very similar tale. The cabinet members are normally selected from within the parliament and, in addition, even those recruited from outside of parliament are normally party members. The very few non-political and non-partisan specialists appointed to government normally act within the strict political guidelines of the party which nominates them, and their activity is the subject of the same political scrutiny as that of a normal partisan appointee. Party sympathy plays an important role in the selection of candidates to numerous non-elective offices of public bureaucracies as well. A change of government, and often even that of an individual minister, usually spells a significant turnover of higher ranked officials within each ministry, despite the fact that bureaucracies are supposed to provide impartial professional services for policy-defining politicians. In the early 1990s, such practice was widely justified by reference to the ‘communist heritage’ of the civil service, presumably in need of incremental restaffing to ensure its impartiality and professional competence. However, more recent trends do not seem to suggest any significant rise in the continuity of people in higher administrative positions; indeed, the change to a Social Democratic government in 1998 meant that not only a range of ministerial employees, but also
several appointees to public agencies and advisory boards were eventually replaced by sympathizers and/or members of parties constituting new governing elites. On the contrary, party control is less apparent in the case of two institutions with appointed officials – the Constitutional Court and the National Bank. These institutions are not accountable to parliament and have clearly defined functions and important constitutional prerogatives. Indeed, the independence of the Court and the Bank is one of the key political conceptions embodied in the Czech constitution. The constitutional position of presidents, too, was meant as a potential constraint on party government. The (re-)election of Havel in 1992 seemed to herald the continuity in the ‘above-parties’ approach to the presidential office, established with his election as the Czechoslovak Federal president in 1990. Though owing his election to a qualified majority in parliament, the non-partisan president was supposed to perform his (largely ceremonial) functions independently of the will of the parliamentary majority and the political parties. The frequent clashes which have subsequently occurred between the president on the one hand, and the government and parliament on the other hand, appeared to confirm such a trend (cf. Baylis 1996). However, to interpret presidential activities as an obstacle to party influence on public policies would be a slight misinterpretation of the situation. Havel often tried to moderate the (unrestricted) rule of majority, rather than to prevent the influence of parties per se. Indeed, Havel’s strong credentials as an independent statesman (and opponent of ‘parties’) were seriously questioned since his involvement in the breakdown of Klaus’ second government in 1996 and his overt building of political alliances with the coalition of smaller centre-right parties (cf. Kunc 1999). Moreover, Klaus himself, elected as the Czech president in 2003, is an ex-chairman of the largest party (ODS), as well as a staunch proponent of the party government model. Parties have also managed to establish a monopoly of control over the decisionmaking processes, whereby civil society actors’ relative autonomy vis-à-vis parties is checked by their marginal input into the political process (cf. Green and SkalnikLeff 1997). For instance, the trade union’s position in terms of issues of broader political significance remains clearly negligible, despite their position as the largest interest group in the country. Policy demands originating from within civil society are channelled into the political arena on the basis of either a multi-party strategy, or through personal contacts with MPs, ministers and the bureaucracy. And since the fate of these demands ultimately depends on subsequent decisions within parties, governments and parliaments, the independent groups have been ready to gain the support of individual parties, rather than developing a strategy aiming at reducing parties’ overall role in polity. All in all, it appears that there are few visible obstacles to party influence in all major areas of the Czech government. The institutional constraints which exit, such as the powers of the Central Bank and the Constitutional Court, are a mere modification of what could otherwise be an ideal-typical form of party government, unattained in practice even in the era of mass party politics in Western
Europe. Nevertheless, the factors which clearly do, and are likely to continue to consistently undermine the scope of party government is the parties’ limited abilities to increase their presence on the ground, to increase political participation and to monopolize interest articulation. As we shall see below, the aggregate party membership figures are mediocre. Local politics in large areas of both countries is in the hands of elected independents, and both parties and governments feature regularly in the polls as the least trusted institutions. Pop-concerts, sporting events and memorial rallies of all kinds seem to attract far more public attention than any mass event organized by political parties and attended by leading politicians, except for the relatively short periods of electoral campaigns. Similarly, numerous single-issue groups, and even the media, probably account for a larger share of interest articulation than parties do themselves. Put differently, the parties’ linkage function, in the sense of being a vent for civic activity and a channel of communication, founders on the low level of citizens’ direct involvement in or around political parties, if not on the parties’ indifference to forging solid links with their constituencies. The ability of Czech parties to penetrate and organize state institutions thus appears significantly greater than their ability to penetrate society at its grass-roots level. Parties and the Party System The origins of the Czech party system date back to the early 1990s in the Federal Czechoslovakia, when the electorally dominant, but ideologically diverse opposition movement – Civic Forum (OF) in the Czech Republic and the Public against Violence in Slovakia – started to disintegrate into a number of distinct parties. With a few exceptions, the Czech and Slovak parties had already had a national mandate and base of electoral support, reinforced by the rapidly diverging (perceptions of) social and economic realities in the two constituent parts of the Federation. It was at that time that, in the Czech part of the Federation, the now dominant Left-Right divide started to crystallize and replace an amorphous cultural conflict centred on the communist/non-communist divide. The elite which eventually seized power within OF formed around a group of liberal economic technocrats, led by the founder of the Civic Democratic Forum (ODS), the former prime minister and now the president, Václav Klaus, who largely succeeded in modelling emerging institutions in accordance with a highly individualistic liberal blueprint, and who framed social and political conflict in terms of a struggle for allocation of economic resources. Well-grounded research now shows that party system competition in the Czech Republic is of a one-dimensional nature, with the dominant conflict is structured alongside a socioeconomic dimension (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Krause 1996, Markowski 1997, Evans and Whitefield 1998, Kitschelt et al. 1999). The Czech parties compete primarily on positions clustered around questions of social security, redistribution of economic resources, taxation and the role of the State in
the economy. The composition of government coalitions has so far been a perfect embodiment of these bipolar and rather strongly pronounced lines of conflict: the right-of-centre coalition of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and the Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) formed the government in 1992, and again in 1996; the left-ofcentre Social Democrats (ČSSD) formed the (minority) government in 1998 and, together with KDU-ČSL and the Freedom Union (US), after the 2002 elections. Interestingly, the coalition formed in 2002 is the least consistent in this respect, uniting the centrist KDU-ČSL and leftist ČSSD, with a right-of-centre liberal US. It is also a government coalition which has experienced the most internal tensions so far. Indeed, the government collapsed in June 2004 in small parts because of the internal tensions within the ČSSD, where many leading politicians and party activists started to question the coalition with the more right-of-centre orientated parties, especially the US, following the disastrous party performance in the elections to the European Parliament. The one-dimensional nature of party competition of course does not mean that other issues do not occasionally play a role in political competition, or that other issues are not important for the profile of individual parties. For example, while generally embracing market reforms, liberalization and deregulation, the Christian Democratic Union-the People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) have always advocated a set of active state policies to support the life of families. Moreover, given that the party is electorally very firmly established in rural (Catholic) areas of South Bohemia and Moravia, it has also, perhaps more than any other party, catered to the interests of farmers, and campaigned for active regional policies. These issues of course square easily with the dominant left-right dimension. Indeed, given the KDU-ČSL combination of pro-market and pro-social policies, it has become a party perfectly acceptable for coalitions with both the right (i.e. the ODS) and the left (i.e. the ČSSD). However, KDU-ČSL MPs have also campaigned for years (unsuccessfully) to limit liberal pro-choice policies of the Czech State; the party has firmly stood on the side of those advocating repressive measures in policies towards the production, distribution and use of drugs. The position of the party on these issues, especially on the question of abortions, is out of line with most other parties. But given the relative unimportance of these issues in the overall pattern of party competition, it has never been able to thwart the pivotal position of the KDUČSL in coalition formation following all parliamentary elections. Nationalism has always been important for both the now almost defunct extreme-right Republican Party (SPR-RSČ) and the unreformed Communist Party of Bohemia and Silesia (KSČM). When the Republicans were in parliament (19921998, see also Table 6.1 below), they heavily criticized the Czech pro-EU integration stances, associating closer integration with the sell-outs by the Czech industry to Western (namely German) multinational companies. Similar stances have been present in the ideological positions of the KSČM – the successor communist party, which has domestically been considered as an extreme left-wing and anti-system, and thus pariah, party. The party’s nationalism manifested itself,
among other things, on two main occasions: when the party actively campaigned against the Czech NATO membership (gained in 1999), and later during the campaign in the run up to the EU accession referendum (in 2004), in which the KSČM was the only parliamentary party to recommend their voters to vote ‘No’. Certain nationalist overtures have also been present in the proclamations of the KSČM’s key rival on the left of the political spectrum – the Social Democratic party (ČSSD). This was most notable when the former party leader, Miloš Zeman, reopened the issue of the so-called Beneš Decrees in 2002 – a set of policies, which expelled members of the German minority in the aftermath of the WWII from the country, for their commonly adjudged complicity with Nazi Germany. However, this was probably more an act of political opportunism, or simply one of the (many) unfortunate comments of the somewhat maverick former prime minister, rather than a deliberate attempt to integrate nationalism into the party’s political profile. Indeed, with the exception of the far right and the communists, and apart from the immediate EU pre-accession period, both the Beneš Decrees and nationalism have been of secondary importance to most Czech political parties, including the ČSSD, which is perhaps the most pro-EU and internationalist party on the political scene. Many observers nevertheless argue (e.g. Hanley 2004) that a significant shift in the direction of nationalism can now be observed in the ideology of the largest and electorally the most successful right-of-centre political party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). The ODS, and its former leader, currently the country’s president, Václav Klaus, have been associated with the country’s post-communist economic reform. In socioeconomic terms, the ODS has consistently advocated (though not always implemented) measures aimed at further liberalization, privatization, marketization and debureaucratisation of the economy and society. It is also these policies, and their underlying ideological assumptions, which have been crucial to the ODS’ public profile. However, the ODS is also perhaps the most consistent and most outspoken Eurosceptic formation in the CEE region (see Kopecký and Mudde 2002, and Kopecký 2004b). The party supported Czech EU entry, but has vehemently opposed enhanced political integration and any trends towards supranationalism within the EU. Moreover, mainly but not exclusively in its policies towards the EU, the ODS has increasingly adopted the rhetoric of defending ‘Czech national interests’, prompting observers to put the party into the same category on these issues as the Communists. Interestingly, however, it was precisely when the ODS attempted to make national issues one of the key themes of their electoral campaign that the party polled its lowest share of votes ever. This happened during the 2002 elections in which, like in all the previous post-1992 elections, the economic and social issues, and the competence of government on these issues, turned out again to be decisive to the election outcome. As the Table 6.1 shows, there have been changes, sometimes dramatic, in the electoral fortunes of individual parties, as well as several splits and mergers between political parties. Most notably, these resulted in the near extinction of the small conservative ODA and its replacement (in electoral, and largely also in
ideological, terms) with the Freedom Union (US) – the party which itself is the product of a dramatic split of the ODS at the end of 1997 which precipitated the fall of Klaus’ second right-of-centre government. Similarly, the parties representing Moravian regionalist sentiments (HSD-SMS) fell into oblivion by the 1996 elections, after two successful electoral campaigns (in 1990 and 1992). Contrary to most predictions, the extreme-right SPR-RSČ did not return to the post-1998 elections parliament, even though the party previously enjoyed two electoral terms as a ‘pariah’ of the same institution.
