ABSTRACT
A familiar way to read the Wittgenstein corpus is to see it as split into two periods during which two radically different accounts of the nature of language are advanced. Such great emphasis is often placed on this shift that it is common to speak of 'two Wittgensteins', the early and the late. To many, the Tractatus appears to be a strange, escalating series of philosophical pronouncements. As Brockhaus suggests, it is usual for it to be viewed as an undefended presentation of semi-independent metaphysical theses. There is an apparent tension in the Tractatus, which is notoriously identified by Wittgenstein at its very close. By insisting that what can be shown cannot be said, Wittgenstein was preparing people for the idea that they cannot say anything about the logical form of propositions. Diamond is right in that to think that Wittgenstein was suggesting that there could not be ethical 'doctrines' or 'propositions'.
