ABSTRACT
On 9 December 2002, a ship operated by a North Korean crew carrying 12 disassembled Scud missiles bound for Yemen was boarded and seized by Spanish and United States military forces in the Arabian Sea (Ricks and Slevin 2002). While the United States had the authority to stop and search the ship, it did not have the authority to seize the vessel, which was later released to the Yemeni government. In response, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer remarked: ‘The US inability to prevent the North Korean Scud transfer to Yemen demonstrates a need to improve international regimes against missile proliferation. One thing that this does underscore is the need to take a look [at] – and we will do so with friends and others around the world – whether or not the international regimes that deal with missile proliferation need a second look’ (Global Security Newswire 2002). The Yemeni Scuds case represents some of the more salient challenges confronting contemporary missile non-proliferation efforts, undertakings that have traditionally centred upon the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
