ABSTRACT
Traditional libertarians argue that determinism precludes free action by, for example, precluding an agent’s being ultimately responsible for anything. Theorists who hold that no human being acts freely can benefit from arguments on both sides, contending that libertarians identify ‘the concept’ of free action – an incompatibilist concept – and that compatibilist critics of libertarianism show that this concept is incoherent or uninstantiable. Ordinary libertarians about free action and moral responsibility claim that these phenomena are incompatible with determinism. A softer line is available to philosophers with libertarian sympathies. A theorist may leave it open that freedom and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism, but maintain that the falsity of determinism is required for more desirable brands of these things. Libertarians have offered various responses to the problem of luck. Another kind of luck may be relevant to moral responsibility and freedom.
