ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Harry Frankfurt’s argument against principle of alternate possibilities’ (PAP) by presenting a counterexample that draws on the intuitions that led Frankfurt to reject PAP. It shows that there are arguments for PAP that parallels the several intuitive arguments for the Maxim. This suggests a reason over and the Derivation for thinking that PAP and the Maxim are theoretical siblings. The chapter discusses the objection that the Derivation turns on an equivocation in the sense of the ‘ability’ to do otherwise. It also discusses objections to two inferences that are steps in the Derivation, an inference from moral blameworthiness to wrongdoing and an inference from wrongdoing to the violation of a moral requirement. The chapter describes a strategy for arguing against the thesis that the ability to do otherwise would be ruled out by determinism. Frankfurt appears to mean that the person ‘can hardly be said to be blameworthy for his action.’
